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Blockchain networks and similar cryptoeconomic networks are systems, specifically complex systems. They are adaptive networks with multi-
scale spatio-temporal dynamics. Individual actions may be incentivized towards a collective goal with “purpose-driven” tokens. Blockchain
networks, for example, are equipped cryptoeconomic mechanisms that allow the decentralized network to simultaneously maintain a universal
state layer, support peer-to-peer settlement, and incentivize collective action. These networks represent an institutional infrastructure upon
which socioeconomic collaboration is facilitated – in the absence of intermediaries or traditional organizations. They provide a mission-critical
and safety-critical regulatory infrastructure for autonomous agents in untrusted economic networks. Their tokens provide a rich, real-time data
set reflecting all economic activities in their systems. Advances in network science and data science can thus be leveraged to design and
analyze these economic systems in a manner consistent with the best practices of modern systems engineering. Research that reflects all
aspects of these socioeconomic networks needs (i) a complex systems approach, (ii) interdisciplinary research, and (iii) a combination of
economic and engineering methods, here referred to as “economic systems engineering,” for the regulation and control of these socioeconomic
systems. This manuscript provides a conceptual framework synthesizing the research space and proceeds to outline specific research questions
and methodologies for future research in this field, applying an inductive approach based on interdisciplinary literature review and relative
contextualization of the works cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cryptoeconomics is an emerging field of economic coordination games in cryptographically secured peer-to-peer
networks. The term cryptoeconomics was casually coined in the Ethereum developer community, and is generally
attributed to Vitalik Buterin. The earliest recorded citation is from a talk by Vlad Zamfir [Zamfir 2015], which was
later loosely formalized in blog posts and talks by Buterin [Buterin 2017a], [Buterin 2017b]. The term has gained
traction in the broader developer community [Tomaino 2017a] and in the academic community [Catalini and Gans
2016], but it still remains under-defined, possibly because it is often used in so many different contexts. Using the
same term in different contexts leads to communication breakdowns and challenges when trying to come up with
a rigorous definition of that term.
Zamfir and Buterin are both protocol researchers at the Ethereum foundation. Buterin’s work focuses on pro-
grammatic resource allocation strategies, e.g. [Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl 2019], whereas Zamfir has crossed into
political economics with a focus on governance and law [Zamfir 2017], [Zamfir 2019]. The microeconomic study
of cryptoeconomic networks, as pursued by Buterin and many others, is the most commonly used perspective,
as it lies neatly within the overlap of mechanism design in economics and computer science; see [Nisan et al.
2007]. One weakness of such a computer science perspective is the tendency to view the technology as neutral
and to downplay the creators’ responsibility for outcomes [Walch 2019]. This is in stark opposition to the systems
engineering literature which places a large responsibility on engineers responsible for design and maintenance
of critical infrastructure [Leveson 2016]. A more comprehensive view of cryptoeconomic networks is that they
have enabled new types of institutional infrastructure to emerge and will likely continue to foster slow but lasting
changes to our social and economic systems which will require legal innovations [De Filippi 2018], [Werbach
2018]. In light of these changes, there is a renewed urgency in the study of economics at the institutional scale
[Berg, Davidson and Potts 2019]. However, while many researchers and developers seem to agree that cryptoe-
conomic networks greatly expand the economic design space, comparatively few acknowledge that the economic
models used to date are performative and their design is subjective, [Virtanen et al. 2018].
This paper explores why the term “cryptoeconomics” is context dependent and builds up to providing comple-
mentary micro, meso, and macro definitions (Section 9). These context dependent definitions are the synthesis
of examinations of cryptoeconomic systems in terms of complexity (Section 2), interdisciplinarity (Section 3),
institutional (Section 4), coordination (Section 5), emergence (Section 6), network structure (Section 7), and
tokenization (Section 8). The final section (10) focuses on potential research directions and serves as an outlook
rather than a conclusion. It identifies potential future research areas that build on the assumptions and definitions
provided in this paper.
2. A COMPLEX SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
Systems theory [Von Bertalanffy 1969] [Meadows 2008] provides a means to describe any system by its structure,
purpose, functioning, as well as spatial and temporal boundaries, including its interdependencies with its environ-
ments [Moffatt and Kohler 2008][Parrott and Lange 2013]. Complex systems theory investigates the relationships
between system parts with the system’s collective behaviors and the system’s environment [Nagel 2012].
Complex systems differ from other systems in that the system level behaviour cannot be inferred from the local
state changes induced by individual network actors [Parrott and Lange 2013]. Modeling approaches that ignore
such difficulties will produce models that are not useful for modeling and steering those system.
Properties such as emergence, nonlinearity, adaptation, spontaneous order, and feedback loops are typical to
complex systems [Bar-Yam 2002]. Complex systems research draws contributions from various scientific domains
such as mathematics, biology, physics, psychology, meteorology, sociology, economics, and engineering [Parrott
and Lange 2013], which all contribute to complexity science, leveraging both analysis and synthesis; analytic
Fig. 1 Cryptoeconomic systems are complex socioeconomic systems.
processes reduce systems to better understand their parts, whereas synthesis is required to understand the whole
as greater than the sum of its parts [Quine 1951].
Systems theory can contribute tools for the analysis of how the relationships and dependencies between a
cryptoeconomic systems’ parts can determine system-wide properties. It allows for the discovery of system’s
dynamics, constraints, conditions, and principles of cryptoeconomic networks with the aim to understand, model
,and steer them.
A cryptoeconomic system such as the Bitcoin network can be described as a special class of complex socioeco-
nomic system that is dynamic, adaptive, and multi-scale. Cryptoeconomic networks are dynamic due to the flow
of information and assets through the network. Cryptoeconomic networks are adaptive because their behaviour
adjusts in response to their environment, either directly in the case of the Bitcoin difficulty controller or more
broadly through decisions on the part of node operators. Cryptoeconomic networks are multi-scale because they
are specified by local protocols but are defined by their macro-scale properties, as is the case with the local ”no
double spend” rule guaranteeing a globally conserved token supply [Zargham, Zhang and Preciado 2018]. Their
design requires a strong interdisciplinary approach to develop resilient protocols that account for the spatial and
temporal dynamics of those networks [Liaskos, Wang and Alimohammadi 2019].
3. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE
Interdisciplinary research has been identified as an appropriate research method when (i) the research subject in-
volves complex systems and when (ii) the research question is not confined to a single discipline [Repko 2008].
The necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to the research of complex systems has been addressed by Gen-
eral Systems Theory [Von Bertalanffy 1969], in particular Cybernetics [Wiener 1965], [Barkley Rosser 2010].
Economists like Friedrich Hayek for example were influenced by the interdisciplinary field of Cybernetics, which
leveraged systems theory methods available in his time [Oliva 2016], [Lange 2014].
The interdisciplinary research process is often heuristic, iterative and reflexive, and borrows methods from spe-
cific disciplines, where appropriate. It is deeply rooted in the disciplines, but offers a correction to the disciplinary
way of knowledge creation [Dezure 1999], transcending disciplinary knowledge via the process called integration
[Repko 2008]. While disciplines are regarded as foundational, they are also regarded as inadequate to address
complex problems, sacrificing comprehensiveness and neglecting important research questions that fall outside
disciplinary boundaries. Given the fact that blockchain networks and similar crptoeconomic systems provide a
governance infrastructure [Voshmgir 2017] for socioeconomic activities, a symbiosis of both disciplinary and in-
terdisciplinary research is needed to achieve the necessary breath and depth related to complex systems [Repko
2008].
The interdisciplinary research process includes: (i) identification of relevant disciplines, (ii) mapping research
questions to identify the disciplinary parts, (iii) reducing the number of potentially relevant disciplines, (iv) lit-
erature review in relevant disciplines and for relevant research questions, (v) developing adequacy in relevant
disciplines, (vi) analyzing problems and evaluating insights, and (vii) integrating insights and creating common
ground for insights [Repko 2008].
In the context of cryptoeconomic systems, we have identified the following disciplines as relevant: Industrial
and Systems Engineering, AI, Optimization and Control Theory, Computer Science and Cryptography, Economics
and Game Theory, Psychology and Decisions Science, Political Science, Institutional Economics and Governance,
Philosophy, Law and Ethics, as well as Operations Research and Management Science. The wide range of disci-
plines may seem arbitrary but they are in fact bound by a central concept: allocation of resources. In particular,
Fig. 2 Venn diagram of disciplines related to cryptoeconomic systems engineering.
cryptoeconomic networks provide coordination and scaling for resource allocation decisions of stakeholders with
unique preferences, information, and capabilities. Allocation decisions being made include resources which are:
(i) physical, such as hardware and electricity; (ii) financial, such as tokens or fiat money; and (iii) social such as
attention, e.g. governance participation, code contributions or evangelism. Envisioning, designing and governing
cryptoeconomic systems requires the following questions to be considered:
— Who gets to make which decisions, under which circumstances, and to whom are they accountable for those
decisions? Furthermore, how does this change over time?
— How do individuals make decisions given knowledge of the rules of the system, and subject to uncertainty about
the decisions of others?
— How can a system be engineered to processes individual decision making into collective decision making such
that system may be interpreted as coordinating toward a shared purpose?
Unsurprisingly, disciplinary bias and disciplinary jargon [Repko 2008] are challenges that need to be over-
come in the interdisciplinary research process. Addressing this class of challenges adequately in cryptoeconomics
research will be crucial to advancing research in this field. The existence of disciplinary jargon will require the
development of a common language, or a Rosetta Stone [Gilbert 1998], to facilitate cross disciplinary communica-
tion. Auto-ethnographic experience of the authors has furthermore shown that multidisciplinary teams’ members
require methods to facilitate the transfer of the state of knowledge between researchers of different disciplines.
These “knowledge state updates” require time and effort and make the research process slower than in disciplinary
research setups.
4. AN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
The interdisciplinary approach narrowed to the scope of economics brings the institutional perspective to the fore-
front. Institutional economics is a subset of economics that intersects with political science, sociology, history,
management science and cybernetics. It studies the role of formal or informal – and public or private institutions
– that are represented by a set of rules, norms, procedure, convention, arrangement, traditions or customs to steer
socioeconomic interactions [Chavance and Wells 2008] [Veblen 1973], [Fararo and Skvoretz 1986], [Williamson
2000], [Coase 1937]. Governments, markets, firms, physical infrastructure, and even social patterns such as mar-
riage are institutions.
Fig. 3 Cryptoeconomic systems as institutions with social and algorithmic governance feedback loops
The Internet is an institution, and a piece of cultural infrastructure from which many distributed Internet tribes
have formed over time [Phillips 2000], first around the infrastructural layer of the Internet [Mueller 2010], and
then on the application layer such as e-commerce platforms [Re 1997], [Zhu and Thatcher 2010], [Schmitz et al.
2002], knowledge platforms [Adams and Gordon 1989], or social media platforms. The institutional nature of
the internet is underscored by the emergence of recognizable forms in self-organising communities as social
activities migrate into digital spaces [Frey and Sumner 2019]. Though platform economies and associated network
effects have driven the internet toward more centralized power structures, platform cooperativism demonstrates
that digitalization, when wielded by communities, can be a force for democracy [Scholz and Schneider 2017].
Cryptoeconomic networks enable more fluid organizations to formalize over the Internet - around a specific
economic, political, or social purpose - commonly referred to as a “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations”
or “DAOs” by the crypto-community [Buterin 2014], [Wright and De Filippi 2015]. They reinvent the institu-
tional composition of the Internet, allowing distributed Internet tribes to self-organize and coordinate in a more
autonomous way - steered by purpose-driven tokens (read more on purpose-driven tokens in section 10.1). The
network protocol and/or the smart contract code formalize the governance rules of the network, regulating and
enforcing the behavior of all network participants.
As institutional infrastructure, cryptoeconomic networks resemble nation states much more than they resemble
companies. Their protocols are comparable to the constitution and the governing laws of a nation state [Lessig
2009], in a combination of formal (on-chain) and informal (off-chain) rule sets. The network protocols and smart
contract represent the computational constitution, while the adaptive social decision processes represent a body of
values and rules which govern the collective decision-making process [Zargham et al. 2020], [Voshmgir 2020].
Cryptoeconomic networks provide an infrastructure that can change the composition and dynamics of existing
institutions, since the use of such infrastructure can (i) reduce the principal-agent dilemma of organizations pro-
viding more transparency, (ii) disintermediate by reducing bureaucracy, and (iii) replace the reactive procedural
security of the current legal system, with proactive and automated mechanisms that make a potential breach of
contract expensive and therefore infeasible [Davidson, De Filippi and Potts 2016], [Voshmgir 2017], [Allen et al.
2020]. Contract theory and the notion of incomplete contracts are an important institutional aspect in this context
and will be discussed in section 10.3 of this paper.
The institutional economist Thorstein Veblem described socioeconomic institutions as complex adaptive sys-
tems, stating that they ”are products of the past process, are adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore
never in full accord with the requirements of the present” [Veblen 1973] and pointed out the need for a feedback
mechanism to maintain an institutional integrity in the light of their complex adaptive nature.
Walter [Hamilton 1919] also pointed out the complex nature of economic systems and ”claimed that institutional
economics alone could unify economic science by showing how parts of the economic system related to the whole”
[Hodgson 2000] and that ”economic theory must be based on an acceptable theory of human behaviour.”
5. THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION PERSPECTIVE
It is up for debate whether the economic theories applied in the conceptualization of these cryptoeconomic net-
works are - in fact - ”based on an acceptable theory of human behaviour” as expressed by [Hamilton 1919].
Common mathematical and game theoretic arguments about cryptoeconomic networks are based on the canonical
results on the evolution of cooperation in an iterative prisoners dilemma [Axelrod and Hamilton 1981], [Rapoport,
Chammah and Orwant 1965]. These results demonstrate that coordination is possible (sufficient condition) in the
presence of selfish actors, not that it is ‘only possible’ (necessary conditions) in the presence of selfish actors.
Fig. 4 Micro-Economic foundations and Macro-Economic context together form the basis of a multi-scale model
required to capture interscale effects common in complex systems.
This framing is powerful, but the economic framing and behavioral assumptions made are rather limited com-
pared with the existing body of relevant literature. While cryptoeconomics is interdisciplinary by nature, it has so
far predominantly been developed in the computer science community. It seems that there is still much room to
incorporate methods from various economic disciplines, that are very often interdisciplinary in themselves, like
for example political economy (political science) or behavioural economics (cognitive psychology) and business
law (legal studies) [Voshmgir 2020]. The idea, for example, that the coordination of a cryptoeconomic system is
derived from pure self-interest of individual actors is a conjecture, which while useful as a narrative is unlikely to
be factual. For example, the Miner’s Dilemma [Eyal 2015] implies that the observed mining pools would break
down under pure selfishness.
Therefore, it is entirely possible and actually more likely that cryptoeconomic systems exist as a result of a
mixture of strategies, also referred to as norms as in more recent work on the evolution of cooperation [Yamamoto
et al. 2017], [Peters and Adamou 2019]. The iterated prisoner’s dilemma is an approximation of a complex social
phenomena, [Axelrod 1997], and continued study has provided additional insights around concepts such as indirect
reciprocity [Nowak 2006] and meta-incentives [Okada et al. 2015], which are directly relevant to the study of
cryptoeconomics, in so far as it is viewed as means to engineer incentives that make cooperative norms resistant
to invasion by selfish ones in cryptoeconomic networks. In the evolution of cooperation literature theoretical,
computational and empirical methods are applied to the study of populations of agents making individual decisions
according to certain strategies, with an emphasis on the non-obvious system level properties that arise, and how
these properties induce changes in future behavior.
6. A MULTISCALE PERSPECTIVE
Economic systems are often observed to have properties that are not directly attributable to the agents, processes,
and policies that make up the economic system. Understanding the emergent properties as arising from relation-
ships between the agents, processes, and policies requires a multiscale perspective. Through a synthesis of these
perspectives on multi-scale systems, a basic formula for framing practical economic models is shown in Figure 4.
Any model requires assumptions about the properties of its constituent parts and assumptions about the environ-
ment or larger system in which the model is embedded. Couched in economic terms the model of the larger system
provides macro-economic context and the models of the constituent parts provide micro-economic foundations.
Applying a multiscale perspective to economic systems is not a new idea. It has been addressed implicitly by
representatives of the Austrian School of Economics, and also other heterodox economic schools including Com-
plexity Economics [Foster 2005], [Montuori 2005], [Bateson et al. 1989] and Ecological Economics [Common and
Stagl 2005], [Schumacher 2011]. While Ecological Economics was originally motivated by ecology rather than
systems theory, it also criticized the failings of the orthodox economic canon in addressing the complex dynamics
that arise when there are interaction effects between parts and wholes with special attention to human activity as
being a part of the natural world. The Lucas Critique [Lucas 1976] is a relatively recently yet widely accepted idea
in macroeconomics that explicitly addresses feedback effects between micro and macro scale behavior. The need
for multiscale representations is further borne out in Evolutionary Economics [Dopfer, Foster and Potts 2004] and
in the standard practice of systems engineering [Hamelin, Walden and Krueger 2010].
Through the multiscale perspective, it is possible to study interscale phenomena such as emergence as shown
in Figure 5. “Emergence (...) refers to the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during
Fig. 5 Multi-Scale Feedback: In cryptoeconomic networks the system level behavior emerges from the agent level
behavior responding to rules and incentives implemented as part of cryptoeconomic policy design.
the process of self organization in complex systems. Emergent phenomena are conceptualized as occurring on the
macro level in contrast to the micro level components and processes out of which they arise.” [Goldstein 1999].
Emergence closes the feedback loop of the macro, meso and micro level activities where policy makers measure
phenomena on a macro level, decide over new policies on a meso level, and implement these policies impacting
agent behavior a micro level, which in turn result in systemic effects that can only be measured on a macro level.
An example of Multi-scale feedback in the Bitcoin Network is the interaction between the proof-of-work game
being played between the agents (miners), and the Bitcoin Network itself. By introducing a feedback loop to
correct the difficulty1 and maintain the ten minute block time, the system itself becomes part of the game. One
way of viewing this macro-scale game is as a two player game between the miners as a population and the network
itself. The miners as a collective have their action space defined by the total hashpower provided and the network’s
action space is to set the difficulty. Even though all of the miners know what strategy the network is playing, the
fact that they are still playing a micro-scale game with each other leads to increases in hashpower despite the fact
that this is objectively more expensive than providing less hashpower for the same predetermined block rewards.
Another example of multiscale dynamics in cryptoeconomic systems are bonding curves [De La Rouviere
2017], including liquidity pools such as Bancor [Hertzog, Benartzi and Benartzi 2017] and Uniswap [Angeris et al.
2019]. A detailed analysis of bonding curves shows that they encode nontrivial configurations spaces [Zargham,
Shorish and Paruch 2019], wherein simple behaviors on the part of individual agents can collectively induce
emergent changes to the global state. The interplay between local agent and global system state are explored
further in [Zargham, Paruch and Shorish 2020]. This line of mathematical and computational research is consistent
with multi-scale systems in robotics, [Kia et al. 2019], [Tsitsiklis 1984]. The Bitcoin network and bonding curve
examples show the relevance of multiscale models for cryptoeconomic systems because neither the micro-scale
game played between the entities in these systems, nor observations of the macro-scale properties, are sufficient
to characterize the system dynamics.
7. A NETWORK SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
A cryptoeconomic system is a kind of complex system that can be represented by interacting components that
collectively form a network. Informally, a network is a group or system of interconnected people or things. A
formal mathematical definition of a network is a graph G = {V ,E} made up of a set of vertices V and set of
edges E ⊆ V ×V . The edges are simply pairs of vertices and when the order of the vertices matters, the edge
(i, j) is said to be directed from i to j. Applying graph theory and networked dynamical systems to study social
and economic networks is called network science [Baraba´si et al. 2016] and therefore relevant in the context of
analyzing and modeling cryptoeconomic systems.
As networks grow the number of relationships between entities grows exponentially compared to the number
of entities in the network [Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2004]. Furthermore, the topology of the network itself can
1To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by
a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they’re generated too fast, the difficulty increases.[Nakamoto 2008]
Vertex Type Definition
Entity Off-chain unique identity of a person or organization
Account On-chain address controllable via a private key
Node Software and hardware participating in a peer-to-peer network
Table I Vertex Types & Definitions in the Bitcoin System
Entity Account Node
Entity has relationship with controls keys of operates
Account transfers funds to
Node sends rewards to is peer of
Table II Edge types and definitions to be read as directed edges from column to row.
have significant influence on processes playing out within the network [Newman 2010] [Boccaletti et al. 2006].
The interactions between the parts of the system, including agent behaviors, and between the system and its
environment often result in unexpected emergent properties, which in practice necessitates some form of human
governance for cryptoeconomic networks [Voshmgir 2017].
A cryptoeconomic system like a blockchain network is a multigraph because it has different types of vertices
and edges which include labeling maps for the vertices and edges. Depending on the type of network the vertices
can be: (i) nodes representing computer software in the peer to peer computation and communication network,
(ii) accounts are addresses in the financial network, (iii) entities are identities of people and organizations in an
off-chain socioeconomic network. Vertices are depicted in Table I.
A cryptoeconomic network consists of three interconnected networks: (i) the computation and communication
network comprised of nodes that leverage a peer-to-peer protocol to validate transactions by mining new blocks,
(ii) the financial network comprised of Bitcoin addresses, which may sign transactions and transfer funds, and
the (iii) the off-chain socioeconomic network representing people and organizations that control the tokens in
the financial network and operate those nodes in the computation and communication network. A summary of
the types of edges is provided in table II. Incidentally, this hierarchical layering of networks is consistent with
strategies for optimization decomposition [Chiang et al. 2007], providing a formal basis vertically disintegrated
network economies [Aymanns, Dewatripont and Roukny 2019]. In blockchain networks, the base layer data struc-
ture comes with cryptographic guaranties, but does not represent a human readable ledger, rather a formal mapping
to the statespace representation is required to lift the data from its hash space to the record of accounts, which is
recognizable as a ledger [Shorish 2018].
8. TOKENS AS SYSTEM STATE
Tokens represent a part of the state of any cryptoeconomic system and can be seen as their atomic unit [Voshmgir
2020]. The term state refers to a unique set of data (the ledger) that is collectively managed by all nodes in the
network. Tokens are a representation of an individualized state of an economic system, including a specific right
to change the system state. The existence of a universal state makes tokens provable and durable, and is a solution
to the double spending [Nakamoto 2008] of digital values over the public networks.
While the existence of tokens in general and digital tokens in particular is not new, cryptoeconomic systems
provide a public infrastructure that allow the issuance and management of tokens with lower friction [Voshmgir
2019]. The speed with which cryptoeconomic systems and their tokenized applications are being deployed, is an
indicator for the pervasiveness of the technology and its applications [Filippova 2019],[Voshmgir 2019]. Tokens
can make all socioeconomic activities publicly verifiable, thus visible to all network actors, and could provide
the basis for data driven economic modeling with more feedback loops of tokenized socioeconomic activities.
However, it is unclear if and when the tokenization of all economic activities will become feasible.
Asset tokens and access-right tokens [Voshmgir 2019] represent business models and governance systems that
are mostly well understood, and can be categorized as simple token systems. They can be modeled and steered with
existing reductionist tools [Lipset 1980][Ruse 2005]. Such simple token systems require mostly legal engineering,
which we define as the intersections of information systems and legal studies and deals with the question of how
to make these tokenized use cases regulatory compliant [Voshmgir 2020].
Purpose-driven tokens are tokens that are programmed to steer automated collective action of autonomous
network actors in a public network towards a collective goal in the absence of intermediaries [Voshmgir 2020].
They represent complex token systems and require complex system approach [Foster and Metcalfe 2012][Kurtz
and Snowden 2003] to be modelled. Purpose-driven tokens that enable complex token systems differ from simple
token systems in that they close the loop in so far as the system becomes autonomous and is not being steered by
single institutions. Complex token systems requires mostly economic systems engineering, which we define on the
intersection of information systems and economics including political economy and other related social science
domains. Economic systems engineering can build on systems engineering [Sage 1992], [Blanchard and Fabrycky
1990],[Novikov 2016], but deals with research questions that model and steer aggregate agent behaviour, which
brings us into the emerging field of complex systems engineering [Bar-Yam 2003] [Rhodes and Hastings 2003]
that requires a multi-scale perspective on how to steer these systems.
Table III. Cryptoeconomics∗
Level of Economic Governance Design Bitcoin
Analysis Perspective Perspective Perspective Reference
Global Policy Goals Performance Stability,Macroa Outcomes Measurement Metrics Security, etc.
Institutional Policy Goal Performance InformalMesob Dynamics Setting Targets Governance†
Protocol Implementation Asserted NakamotoMicroc Foundations of Incentives Properties Consensus
∗Cryptoeconomics relates three interactions layers or levels of analysis that
define characteristics at the micro-foundational, meso-institutional, and macro-
observerable domains of scope.
aMacro-observables are system global properties that inform decision-making
at the meso-institutional level and provide stakeholder feedback, performance in-
dicators and measures that can impact micro-foundational properties.
bMeso-institutional characteristics encompass decision-making and goal de-
termination, based upon and requiring micro-foundations. Mechanism design as
used in Economics informs institutions, organisations and teams.
cMicro-foundational characteristics are assumption specifications with a natu-
ral expression within mechanism design as used within Computer Science.
†Informal Governance is a form of decentralized governance whereby changes
to the protocol are made locally by individual participants operating nodes in the
peer-to-peer network and changes only take effect if the majority of participants
adopt the change. In the case of Nakamoto Consensus such a majority is measured
in hashpower.
9. A UNIFYING PERSPECTIVE ON CRYPTOECONOMICS
Cryptoeconomic systems are complex socioeconomic networks defined by (i) individual autonomous actors, (ii)
economic policies embedded in software (the protocol or smart contract code), and (iii) emergent properties arising
from the interactions of those actors with the whole network, according to the rules defined by that software. A
comprehensive definition of cryptoeconomics therefore includes three levels of analysis: (i) micro-foundational,
relating to agent level behaviors (ii) meso-institutional, relating to policy setting and governance and (iii) macro-
observerable, relating to the measurement and analysis the system level metrics. Critically, the dynamics at each
level of analysis are interdependent in a manner which cannot be simply reduced into a single layer–governance
is precisely managing the relationship between the micro and macro scales.
Micro-foundational characteristics of cryptoeconomic systems are commonly expressed in terms of algorith-
mic game theory in the computer science literature [Nisan et al. 2007] and mechanism design in the economics
literature [Hurwicz and Reiter 2006]. Mechanism design is sometimes referred to as reverse game theory as it per-
tains to the construction of games to produce specific behaviors from agents. Nakamoto Consensus, for example,
is a cryptoeconomic mechanism based on proof-of-work that is designed to provide convergence to a dynamic
equilibrium–a synchronous shared global state, which furthermore remains resistant to a range of attacks consti-
tuting of self-interested misinformation despite being a permissionless network. An attack would be any violation
of the state transition rules encoded in the protocol, such as a “double spend’. Nakamoto consensus uses a combi-
nation of cryptographic tools with economic incentives that make economic cost of wrongdoing disproportionate
to the benefit of doing so [Nakamoto 2008], [Antonopoulos 2014]. Proof-of-stake mechanisms provide similar
game theoretic arguments for network security. Interestingly, proof-of-authority networks [De Angelis et al. 2018]
offer a more traditional approach where the validator role is permissioned and stems from social and institutional
reputational processes which exist outside the computational environment. Most current definitions of cryptoeco-
nomics focus on this level of analysis and modeling [Buterin 2017a], [Buterin 2017b] [Tomaino 2017a]. However,
the level of security very much depends on how people react to economic incentives, which in turn has been a field
of study in economics [Voshmgir 2020]; the security of the network is an emergent macro level property.
Macro-observables are system-wide metrics or properties which may inform decision-making of stakeholders
within the system. Macro-observables often include performance indicators that impact governance decisions
at the meso-institutional level as well as measures that can impact perception and thus behavior at the micro-
foundational level. In addition to security, market capitalization, price [Shorish 2019], [Cong, Li and Wang 2019]
and price stability are the most commonly studied macro-observables. Other important macro-observables include
wealth distributions, governance participation, monthly active users, and any other measure or estimate which
serves as a proxy for system level goal that matters to a cryptoeconomic network’s human stakeholders. Critically,
macro-observables are not directly controllable; efforts to impact these metrics are determined at the meso scale
and the consequences of those interventions are borne out at the micro scale.
Meso-institutional characteristics encompass decision-making and goal determination, based upon macro-
observables and requiring micro-foundations. This level builds on political science, law, governance and eco-
nomics to design the steering processes of communities, by some referred to as institutional cryptoeconomics
[Berg, Davidson and Potts 2019]. Ethical design and informed governance of cryptoeconomic systems resides in
the meso-institutional level and requires an understanding of both the micro-foundations and macro-observables,
as well as the relations between them. This manuscript, as a whole, addresses the meso-instutional perspective as
a keystone in the coherent synthesis of macro and micro perspectives on cryptoeconomics through the observation
that automation in socioeconomic systems is tantamount to algorithmic policy making.
10. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Cryptoeconomic systems provide an institutional infrastructure that facilitates a wide range of socioeconomic
interactions. The design space for this institutional infrastructure includes novel socioeconomic interaction pat-
terns thanks to the peer-to-peer protocols’ support for state dependence via tokens. Research regarding the anal-
ysis and design of cryptoeconomic systems is necessarily interdisciplinary. Building on other interdisciplinary
research future work includes - but is not limited to - the following topics: (i) purpose-driven tokens, (ii) data
driven economies, (iii) incomplete contracts, (iv) ethics of decision algorithms as social infrastructure, (v) apply-
ing computational social science to cryptoeconomic systems, and (vi) applying cyberphysical systems engineering
to cryptoeconomic design and analysis.
10.1. Purpose-Driven Tokens
Bitcoin’s proof-of-work [Nakamoto 2008] introduced an incentive mechanism to get network actors to collec-
tively manage a distributed ledger in a truthful manner, by rewarding them with network tokens which are minted
upon proof-of a certain behaviour. The idea of aligning incentives among a tribe of anonymous actors with a
network token, introduced a new type of public infrastructure that is autonomous, self-sustaining, and attack re-
sistant [Voshmgir 2020]. Such networks, therefore, represent a collectively produced and collectively consumed
economic infrastructure. This common economic infrastructure can be viewed as a commons whose design and
governance should be held to Ostrom’s principles [Ostrom 1990]. If there is an underlying optimal choice to
be uncovered through a social process there is some hope that this optimal could be learned via a consensus
process [Jadbabaie et al. 2012]. However, it is more realistic to take a polycentric viewpoint where there is no
one social optimum and thus it is important to take a wider view of social choice [Arrow 2012] [Ostrom 2000]
before embarking on the design of a purpose-driven token. After all, any choice of coordination objective is a
subjective choice. Assuming one can define a common objective, the token designer would encode this objective
as a cost function and strive for dynamic stability around a minimum cost outcome over time as is done with
dynamic potential games [Candogan, Ozdaglar and Parrilo 2013], swarm robotics [Gazi and Passino 2003] and
vehicle formations[Olfati-Saber and Murray 2002]. In all cases the design goal is strong emergence around some
objective [Klein et al. 2001]. It is also possible to envisage the objective selection process as dynamic consensus
[Kia et al. 2019]. Broadly speaking purpose-driven token design lives at the boundary of behavioral economics
and dynamic decentralized coordination in multi-agent systems which bridges with institutional economics[Coase
1998], and in particular platform economics [Rochet and Tirole 2003].
10.2. Data-Driven Economic Systems
Cryptoeconomic systems provide near real-time data of on-chain economic activities, and may govern access
rights or provide proofs related to data stored off-chain. The advancement in machine learning and system identi-
fication methods over the past decade has increased our capacity for creating novel, useful models in across a wide
range of applications [Jordan and Mitchell 2015], and in the context of economics [Mullainathan and Spiess 2017]
in particular. This, for the first time, allows for almost real time steering of these economies and a level of applied
cybernetics that was not possible before. Furthermore, it increases the precision of modeling and measurement
required for steering these economies. This results in a data driven regulatory process, as shown in Figure 3.
However, the advances of machine learned models [Jordan and Mitchell 2015] is a consequence of the growth
of the digital economy that captures a large amount of economic data. This data is largely controlled by large
tech firms operating platform based services, which are often subject to algorithmic bias [Garcia 2016], [Lewis
and Westlund 2015],[Sætra 2019], [Von Foerster 2003]. The stateful nature of cryptoeconomic systems has the
potential to cede control of data back to the users of these platforms, if privacy by design is considered in the
modeling of the cryptoeconomic systems and their applications [Voshmgir 2020].
10.3. Incomplete Contracts
A specific question relevant to cryptoeconomic systems is contract theory [Bolton, Dewatripont et al. 2005], in
particular how to consider incomplete contracts [Hart and Moore 1988] in a computational environment. Contract
theory is the study of contractual arrangements at the intersection of economics and law, and is further divided into
representations where contracts are complete (i.e. all possible outcomes are enumerated in the contract) and where
they are incomplete (i.e. one or more possible contingencies cannot be expressed in the contract), cf. e.g.[Grossman
and Hart 1981],[Grossman and Hart 1983], [Hart and Holmstro¨m 1987], [Hart and Moore 1990]. Contract theory
further addresses the goals of cryptoeconomic system design through its attention to the efficiency of resource
allocation problems [Hurwicz 1960] in cases where information required to solve the associated optimization
problems is distributed amongst agents [Hurwicz 1972].
The theory of complete contracts is based on concepts such as mechanism design [Hurwicz and Reiter 2006]
and principal agent theory [Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991], including concepts such as incentive compatibility,
asymmetric information, adverse selection, and moral hazard [Laffont and Martimort 2009], which are relevant
for algorithmic policy administration, including design of cryptoeconomic systems. While machine level behavior
may be well represented by complete contracts, human behavior rarely is. Incomplete contract theory assumes
that most contracts cannot enumerate contracting outcomes for every possible state of the world as the complexity
of socioeconomic interactions makes it infeasible to formalize any eventuality of a contractual outcome ex-ante
[Tirole 1999]. One can resort to formal dispute resolution (judiciary) or informal dispute resolution (bargaining)
to resolve such contractual gaps [Salanie´ 2005]. The impossibility of codifying every eventuality into a com-
putational constitution or smart contract code and the necessity for dispute resolution and off-chain governance
mechanisms has also been the subject of ample debate within the context of cryptoeconomic systems [Voshmgir
2017], [Voshmgir 2020] and will be a necessary line of research to pursue.
10.4. Ethics and Governance of Decision Algorithms in Social Systems
Assumptions that are programmed into the cryptoeconomic protocols might be biased and will be subject to a
line of ethical studies covering how the associated cryptoeconomic systems behave over time. When automated
systems are envisaged as closed systems they are tantamount to complete contracts–supposing that a prespecified
algorithm suffices to judge all possible eventualities. All algorithms presuppose some representation or model of
reality; models are always reductions of reality based on some assumptions, and therefore must be judged by their
usefulness to some ends[Box 1976][Green and Viljoen 2020]. This places the focus on the assumptions embedded
in the models and the effects those assumptions have on people. By acknowledging the subjective and performative
aspects of models, and more broadly the synergies between human and machine decision makers, the domain
mirrors that of incomplete contracts more closely. The policy-making, machine learning and cryptoeconomic
systems design communities share a common need to address ethical questions about the social-systemic effects
of algorithm design and implementation [Orlikowski and Scott 2015] [Loukides, Mason and Patil 2018]. To design
or govern algorithms which make decisions requires a theory of fairness such as Rawl’s Veil of Ignorance [Rawls
1958] [Heidari et al. 2018]. Fairness cannot be expected to emerge from purely self-interested agents because
fairness provides a constraint on profit seeking behavior [Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986]. As a result, a
code of ethics for algorithm designers, as found in other engineering disciplines [Pugh 2009], is required.
Furthermore, it is important to note that data governance [Soares 2015] is not equivalent to protocol governance.
Data governance relates to the management of rights to read, write or manipulate data. Emerging data economies
must respect regulations such as General Data Protection Regulation [Voigt and Von dem Bussche 2017] and
therefore one cannot simply store private or sensitive information in a public ledger where it cannot be deleted.
However, data governance can be addressed through business process automation [Ter Hofstede et al. 2009] using
smart contracts [Christidis and Devetsikiotis 2016], which encode the aforementioned rights to read, write or
manipulate data which is stored using other cryptographic technologies such as a content addressable distributed
hash tables [Benet 2014]. Federated machine learning [Bonawitz et al. 2017][Geyer, Klein and Nabi 2017] is a
growing area of research, but practical implementation is hindered by the ethical and regulatory requirement that
there are guarantees of privacy preservation [Ahmad, Stoyanov and Lovat 2019].
10.5. Computational Social Science
Computational social science [Johnson and Lux 2011], is a particularly relevant branch of interdisciplinary re-
search for cryptoeconomic systems. This is the primary field of social science that uses computational approaches
in studying the social phenomena [Cioffi-Revilla 2016]. Modern computational social science is much more deeply
coupled with behavioral economics and data science where advanced computational statistics are combined with
social networks, market dynamics, and more [Easley and Kleinberg 2010], [Jackson 2008]. The advancing power
of computation has lead some to refer to computational science as a “new kind of science” [Wolfram 2002]. This
paradigm is backed up by an emerging computational epistemology [Kelly 2000] [Blum and Blum 1975] [Chaitin
2011]. It is precisely in the context of complex systems that counterintuitive outcomes are common, and compu-
tational methods expose unforeseen pitfalls before they can cause irrecoverable harm [Forrester 1971] [Merton
1936]. Computational methods in cryptoeconomic systems combine data science tools with system dynamics and
agent based models to explore the relation between agent behavior and protocol design [Zhang, Zargham and Pre-
ciado 2020]. The approach of combining data with theory and computation is consistent with methods in econo-
physics [Lux 2009] and ergodicity economics [Peters and Adamou 2018], though in the case of cryptoeconomics
the volume and precision of data available for backtesting models is higher.
10.6. Cyberphysical Systems Engineering
In the field of engineering, especially for large scale cyberphysical systems, computer aided design is standard
practice[Baheti and Gill 2011] [Rajkumar et al. 2010]. The United States National Science Foundation defines
a cyberphysical system (CPS) as “a mechanism that is controlled or monitored by computer-based algorithms,
tightly integrated with the Internet and its users. In cyberphysical systems, physical and software components
are deeply intertwined, each operating on different spatial and temporal scales, exhibiting multiple and distinct
behavioral modalities, and interacting with each other in a lot of ways that change with context” [National Science
Foundation Directorate for Computer and Engineering 2010], [Lee 2006], [Lee 2008].
Examples of existing cyberphysical systems include power grids and large scale transportation systems [Greer
et al. 2019], which both share the property that behavior of uncontrolled human actors can create undesirable or
even unsafe conditions in entirely counterintuitive ways. A common criticism for using this analogy is the presence
of attackers, but this a common concern in the CPS literature [Cardenas et al. 2009],[Barreto et al. 2014]. In
practice, the design, operation, and governance of such large scale systems is accomplished through computational
models called digital twins, [Grieves and Vickers 2017] [Uhlemann, Lehmann and Steinhilper 2017] which are
also closely related to the practice of model based systems engineering [Estefan et al. 2007]. Model based systems
engineering has previously been applied for multi-agent systems [DeLoach, Wood and Sparkman 2001] [Fallah
et al. 2010], and the relation from cryptoeconomic networks to cyberphysical systems has already been observed
in the literature, [Bahga and Madisetti 2016].
The systems engineering methodology [Hamelin, Walden and Krueger 2010] as applied to cyberphysical sys-
tems relies on a composite of theoretical, computational, and empirical methods [Banerjee et al. 2011]; thus
building on the experimental economic tradition [Roth 2002] [Kagel and Roth 2016]. A natural path forward is
to treat cryptoeconomic systems as cyberphysical systems and to approach them with the diligence an engineer
must afford to any public infrastructure [Hou et al. 2015]. As with other complex engineered systems, informed
governance requires both specialized tools and expertise, so even when governance systems are polycentric the
parties responsible for governance are accountable to the public they serve [Walch 2015][Ostrom 2010]. To do so,
it is necessary to develop a holistic perspective for cryptoeconomic systems which relates the locally implemented
protocols, behavioral response to those mechanisms, and the systemic properties that emerge therefrom.
The crossover between cyberphysical systems as an engineering concept and a commons as an institutional
economics construct is fertile ground for research in cryptoeconomic systems. The Commons Stack project has
introduced the notion of a cyberphysical commons [Emmett 2019]. Several initiatives are exploring the relation-
ships between governance of commons and cryptonetworks through the lens of Ostrom’s Principles [Rozas et al.
2018], [Schadeck 2019]. Organizations pursuing commons related research include the P2P Foundation [Bauwens,
Kostakis and Pazaitis 2019] and the Commons Engine which is associated with the Holochain technology [Harris-
Braun, Luck and Brock 2018].
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